By Patrick Seale
It is now clear that the proposed political process in Iraq is fatally flawed. If a way is to be found out of the present bloodstained impasse, a fresh start on a new basis is essential. The moment of truth in Iraq is fast approaching.
The first step in the political process – elections on Jan. 30 for a 275-member chamber that is to draft a Constitution ahead of a new round of elections in December – is already gravely in doubt. The elections will either not take place at all or will be rejected as illegitimate by a substantial proportion of the population.
In any event, they will neither end the bloodshed nor institute democracy. Several influential persons have called for the elections to be postponed. Iraq‘s interim president, Ghazi al-Yawar, a prominent tribal chieftain, this week asked the United Nations to reconsider the date of the poll. He was echoing views already expressed by Defense Minister Hazim al-Shaalan and by Adnan al-Pachachi, a highly respected veteran political figure, now leader of a secular grouping, the Independent Democrats. There are strong practical reasons for postponement. In a climate of violence, the security of voters and candidates, of polling stations and UN monitors, cannot be assured.
Canvassing for votes has virtually stopped and several parties no longer dare publish their list of candidates. It is simply too dangerous to do so. In normal circumstances voting would, of course, be desirable, but not at the risk of being blown up. Postponement of the elections would not be a tragedy. On the contrary, a six-month postponement, or an even longer one, could create much-needed breathing space in which to clarify a number of unresolved issues that, at present, cast a dark shadow over the Iraqi political scene. Some of these issues are: the future of American forces in Iraq; the prospects for an Iraqi Army; the role of the Sunni community in the institutions of the state; the possibility of national reconciliation around a blueprint for Iraq‘s future; and the role of Iraq‘s neighbors. The biggest uncertainty in Iraq today concerns American intentions.
To put it bluntly, does the U.S. want to stay or leave? This is the most pressing question U.S. President George W. Bush will have to answer at the start of his new presidential term on Jan. 20. American casualties in Iraq now number about 1,500 dead and well over 10,000 wounded. Instead of decreasing, the casualty rate is increasing. The U.S. Army and National Guard are overstretched. Recruitment has fallen sharply. The war has already cost $130 billion and is expected to soar to over $200 billion. The Bush administration is expected to ask Congress for another $100 billion this year. American public opinion is beginning to rebel. The latest poll suggests that 56 percent of Americans do not think the war is worth the cost in men and treasure.
So, will the U.S. seek a face-saving way out of Iraq? Or do the Washington neoconservatives, who pressed for war, still believe that, by “staying the course,” they can turn Iraq (and its vast oil resources) into a pro-American, Israel-friendly, client state? Such aims now look unrealizable. U.S. strategic interests are not served by a long, drawn out guerrilla war in Iraq. It is surely time for Bush and his advisers to accept the realities of the situation, which are that resistance to the American occupation is getting stronger by the day, that it represents an alliance of nationalist and Islamic forces, that the war is probably unwinnable, and that it has dangerously inflamed anti-American sentiment throughout the Muslim world. A sensible course, which would help defuse the situation, would be for the U.S. to declare that it does not want to establish permanent military bases in Iraq, or control Iraq‘s economy and oil resources, but that, on the contrary, it intends to withdraw its troops during 2005. To sweeten the pill, and partially to restore its image, the U.S. should pledge $30 billion to $50 billion to repair the vast damage it has inflicted in Iraq. The money could be placed in a UN-administered reconstruction fund and disbursed in stages after the evacuation of coalition troops.
I have argued in the past that the only institution capable of holding Iraq together is the Iraqi Army – not the feeble, under-motivated force the U.S. is attempting to create, but a real army under Iraqi command. The Iraqi Army has been purged several times – in 1958, when the monarchy was overthrown; in 1963, following the first Baath coup; in 1968, when Saddam Hussein emerged in the leadership – but each time the institution remained intact. It should now be put back on its feet. The crucial mistake by Paul Bremer, the former U.S. administrator of Iraq, was to dissolve the Iraqi Army. That decision should now be reversed, and most of the former officers and men should be recalled to their barracks under a new high command.
This would be possible once the U.S. announced it was leaving. The once all-powerful Sunni community, some 20 percent of the population, is clearly unhappy at the possibility of being marginalized and stripped of its privileges in a Shiite-dominated Iraq. The leading Sunni political party, the Islamic Party of Iraq, announced last month that it would not take part in the elections. Sunni religious leaders are pondering what to do. Militant Sunni groups, such as Ansar al-Sunna, have threatened to kill any one who votes or helps organize the elections.
10-1-2005
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Assyrian Democratic Organization ADO
