The Assyrian Democratic Organization
Assyrians who still harbor some hope for positive developments in the future of their cause turned their attention to London the second weekend of Tammuz. This was in order to receive some signals of change from an important congress of the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) and ascertain how AUA might adapt itself to the rapidly changing political circumstances.
It must be said at the outset, that one organizational hurdle was cleared, albeit late and overdue, when the reins of the AUA were turned over to a younger General Secretary. Congratulations are in order to Dr. Emanuel Kambar.
Dr. Kambar as a native of Iraq brings to his new position a keen understanding of the political realities of that country. His past association with the Iraqi political opposition, and the fact that he was one of the handful selected as ?frontmen? by the U.S. State Department (in March 2003) suggests the possibility that AUA might finally be determined to take on an important role for pushing our National Question in Iraq.
This is positive and consistent, because since its establishment in 1968 ? with roots going back to See?ta Sepreta (Assyrian Youth Cultural Society of Tehran)- Huyada (Unity) has been seen as the engine behind the formation and expression of modern Assyrian nationalism among our eastern Assyrian communities. Over the years, it has been the fulcrum of Assyrian patriotic thinking in the Diaspora with special emphasis to North America. It attracted the affiliation of the Assyrian American National Federation and, to a limited extend, the Assyrian cause was made visible for the U.S. Administration in Washington, and for some of the United Nations agencies. Because of its worldwide activities it attracted the attention of some Middle Eastern governments, even becoming the target for their Intelligence in the 1970s.
During the same decade of the 1970s, while the Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO) was spreading its basis in Europe, ADO activists naturally placed great hopes in the AUA as an international advocacy organization. In fact, although never formally affiliated with the AUA, ADO over the years has been one of its most active partners. Indeed, Malphono Ninos Aho, an early ADO activist, was in attendance at the recent London conference, and his persuasive appeal to the delegates might have helped facilitating the succession in the leadership. An example of the enduring cooperation between ADO and AUA began in the end of 1980s, when ADO was invited as an ethnic group to become a member of the UNPO, which was then in formation. ADO immediately called AUA to share this important representation.
One of AUA?s important roles has been to maintain national links between the Western Diaspora and our communities in Iran, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Afterwards this approach has been adopted by other organizations as well, though less successful. Such a role was essential as long as the Iron Curtain was separating Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of Internet and progressing globalization, this role became less critical. But aside form this, the AUA pushed a broad Assyrian political agenda, from seeking formal recognition of the Assyrian Genocide to securing an Assyrian homeland. In fact, the first official recognition of the Assyrian Genocide was recorded in 2002 by the Regional Government of New South Wales, and credit for this achievement goes to the Australian branch of the AUA.
But in reality, with the rise of various new Assyrian political parties over the 15 years, AUA?s role as an umbrella organization has become less vital, hence its influence has ebbed. This erosion has been accelerated by an internal power struggle over the future direction of the organization, i.e. whether to remain simply a national umbrella, or whether to become a pure political party. While the first objective was never fulfilled, the latter contradicted with its mission to attract other Assyrian political groups to gather under or around its umbrella.
The changes in Iraq as a result of the first Gulf War swept the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) to the surface. In short order, ADM received the immediate support of the major Assyrian international organizations, such as ADO and AUA. Over time, as ADM was gaining status as a representative of the Assyrians in the no-fly zone of Northern Iraq, so did AUA?s umbrella role purportedly encompassing Iraq recede. Realistically AUA lacked any kind of presence in a part of Mesopotamia where the Assyrian Question was at play. AUA?s marginalization became even more obvious following the fall of the Saddam Regime and the evolution of the ChaldoAssyrian position during Iraq?s transition period. It was now little more than an observer.
The changes at the recent AUA congress occur in a key moment, as Iraq works to create its new legislative and administrative institutions. The ChaldoAssyrians face severe external and internal challenges threatening to reduce them to a historic footnote. The time is short, as the draft constitution will be completed by August 15, with a ratifying election scheduled for Mid-October.
Unfortunately, ChaldoAssyrians have already missed the boat on several key funding milestones, ranging from the former U.N. oil-for-food program monies to the vast sums (mostly U.S.) which have been poured into the effort to rebuild Iraq and prepare it for democracy. Similarly, we risk being squeezed out of any fair share of the oil wealth of the Mesopotamian plain. Adding to the dilemma is the fact that ChaldoAssyrians are divided into varied political factions, each camp lacking a critical mass and resources to influence the course of events. Indeed, this division has opened the way for outsiders to manipulate some of these factions as collaborators.
In more normal times such development would be a sign of pluralism and vitality. But these days are anything but normal, hence over-diversification is causing weakness. It is unfortunate, that most of the ChaldoAssyrian organizations will not have the luxury of sufficient time to go through the learning curve of political maturity. Those with some level of maturity and political experience, like the ADM with a record of modest achievements, have received support and funding for years, yet have been unable to develop a political agenda which can attract our people in Iraq on a broad basis, across major regions where they are settled.
The contrast to the Kurds is dramatic and telling: For years, Kurdish factions fought and killed one another, yet in the end they joined to form a formidable united front, thereby maximizing their political reach in Iraq?s first popular elections. ChaldoAssyrian political parties were incompetent in forming a unified front and to ensure a proper representation prior to the first election in the country. The January 2005 elections represented a major disaster for our people and this underlines the urgency of forming a united ChaldoAssyrian front in order to assure fair representation in the upcoming election. We can ill afford incompetence or lack of discipline in a fast-evolving political arena. A credible home-grown (of the caliber of the late Francis Shabo assassinated in 1993) is the best insurance to protect our people from militant Islamism, and generally for steering our people in the right direction.
It is not an exaggeration to say we are facing a national urgency. Every ChaldoAssyrian political organization must grasp this truth, and ignoring it means risking further disasters. After the elections, it was fashionable to attribute our electoral catastrophe to certain external factors, particularly the threats by Islamist extremists, Kurdish dirty tricks in the Nineveh Plain, and a woefully anemic turnout at the polls by ChaldoAssyrians in the Diaspora. They partially diverted our attention from what we should have under our control. What is urgently needed is a look inward to help us understand what produced this fiasco. We have often blamed our forefathers for failing to seize historic opportunities, but now the ball is in our court.
In general ChaldoAssyrians worldwide are tired of political declarations detached from reality on the ground in Mesopotamia. It is worthwhile in this connection to go over certain AUA statements about Iraq, to see how the organization addresses some discrepancies, and how it intends to proceed to accomplish its stated agenda.
A Historical Homeland (ASSYRIA)
While this is a bold approach, it is also clear that most of our locally active organizations in Iraq – ADM included – hesitate to use the term Assyria. While propagating an abstract Bet-Nahrain as homeland, they confuse it often with ?Kurdistan? and hence accept displacement and Kurdification through appropriation of land as a fact.
Unity under ASSYRIAN name
Particularly since the U.S Census of the Year 2000, the name issue has emerged as an Achilles Heel. Solving the questions appears as difficult as unitying the Gordian Knod. The dilemma is rooted in large measures in the historical labeling of our people (under Ottoman Millet System) according to their religious denomination. For years, nationalist-minded Assyrians lamented the failure of our church leaders to unite doctrinally, despite a common origin and faith today. Today, we debate over semantics and single national nomenclature, while in the process we lost the focus on the key motivation of such a unity. The debate is pursued with abandon and in public, alienating or marginalizing various segments of our people. A pragmatic approach enunciated at the 2003 conference under the slogan “Our Unity and Our National Rights in Iraq” (see the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian General Conference, Baghdad, October 22-24, 2003) resulted in our recognition under the ChaldoAssyrian label by the TAL. Unfortunately, this approach has been questioned not only by some clerics of the Chaldean Church, but similarly undermined by extremists from the Church of the East.
Granting of an Assyrian Administrative Region
This subject has aroused considerable dispute, and it has became clear that Assyrian organizations have lost some credibility in their dealings with the U.S. Administration because of the different positions postured by the exile organizations in contrast to those of the homeland groups. This issue was also highlighted in a recent debate in the British House of Common.
Right to Return to [occupied] Homes and Villages in Iraq
This is a matter closely linked to the definition of ?the Homeland?. In one way or another most of our organizations in Iraq have been taking an opportunistic approach on this. No one seems interested confronting the Iraqi Kurds openly about it.
Few Conclusions
Taking the recent London declaration at face value would suggest that the AUA delegates and the new executive board are prepared for greater hands-on involvement in several regions of the homeland. If so, it will require greater cooperation than we have seen before with the home-grown groups.
I remain convinced that the most urgent task is to become active in the Iraq situation, since we are obviously running out of time. In view of the timetable, it may already be too late for the AUA to have any impact on the course of events.
To that end, I view the following as minimum essential steps:
1) The establishment of a unified front (aka National Front) and the creation of a credible leadership by the active political organizations in Iraq.
ADO was instrumental for preparing Baghdad Conference of 2003 which created an executive board. But the objectives of the conference were quickly undermined, in some instances with malicious intent. Early on Chaldean Church leaders complained about the lack of political leadership and coordination. Had this warnings not been ignored, we might have averted the electoral debacle of last January. While we recognize some ChaldoAssyrians in Baghdad and elsewhere failed to cast a ballot out of fear, we must also accept the general apathy engendered in many due to the low expectations about their leadership.
2) At the earliest possibility, AUA and ADO should jointly assist in organizing a second ?Baghdad Conference?. Although ADO and AUA should remember their role as that of intermediary. The two organizations still enjoy enough credibility among the various groups in Iraq to convince the staying of such a meeting.
3) It is a priority of the highest order that ChaldoAssyrian rights must be embedded in the upcoming constitution. This should encompass proper representation, equitable access to resources, and related issues. To this end, it is essential that we synchronize our efforts with the ChaldoAssyrian members of the constitutional committee. We must all be on the same page.
4) Of equally high order, a consensus must be reached on defining the ?Administrative Area of Nineveh?
5) Last, but certainly not least, steps must be taken to regain the confidence of the U.S Administration.
